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Volume I: Technical Consultation Report 
1.0 Authorization and Notification 
The request to conduct a consultation on the ISS S-Band Corona Discharge Anomaly was 
submitted to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Engineering and 
Safety Center (NESC) on May 8, 2006.  The consultation was approved on May 9, 2006, in an 
out-of-board action by the NESC Director. 
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4.0 Executive Summary 
The Assembly and Contingency Radio Frequency Group (ACRFG) onboard the International 
Space Station (ISS) is used for command and control communications and transmits (45 dBm or 
32 watts) and receives at S-band.  This system is nominally pressurized with gaseous helium 
(He) and nitrogen (N2) at 8 pounds per square inch absolute (psia).
One of the ISS ACRFGs (S/N 002) leaked during operation to a pressure of 1 psia.  An increased 
reflected radio frequency (RF) transmit power signature in this unit was observed on April 13, 
2006.  This ACRFG is a backup system that is normally in not in a powered state.  The primary 
ACRFG (S/N 003) has no detectable pressure decay and has been operating within specification 
limits. 
MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates Ltd. (MDA) was engaged to analyze the operational 
characteristics of this unit in an effort to determine if the anomalous behavior was a result of a 
corona event.  Based on this analysis, MDA did not recommend continued use of this ACRFG.
However, both the primary and backup ACRFGs are required to be active for all Extravehicular 
Activities (EVAs), dockings, and undockings.  In addition, for all EVAs resulting in an 
unmanned ISS, flight rules require both ACRFGs to be operational for command and control of 
the ISS in the event of a problem. 
The planned EVA scheduled for June 1, 2006, required activation of both ACRFGs.  The NESC 
was requested to provide expert support in the area of high-voltage corona and multipactoring in 
an S-Band RF system and to assess the probability of corona occurring in the ACRFG during the 
planned EVA.  The NESC team concurred with the use of S/N 002 during the EVA with the 
stipulation that failure of the unit is possible and should not produce a failure outside the unit. 
Following the successful spacewalk, the NESC team was requested to review the test plan and 
results of an engineering corona test on a bandpass filter assembly believed to be susceptible to 
corona at the reduced pressures. 
Following these reviews, the NESC recommended minimal continued use of S/N 002 ACRFG 
until a replacement unit can be installed.  Following replacement, S/N 002 will be subjected to 
destructive failure analysis in an effort to determine the proximate and root cause(s) of the 
anomalous behavior. 
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5.0 Consultation Plan 
A team with relevant expertise was formed to review and provide expert consultation regarding 
high voltage corona and multipactoring in an S-Band radio (RF) system on the ISS.   
The team’s objectives were to provide expert support in the area of high-voltage corona and 
multipactoring in an S-Band RF system, read and evaluated reports from the S-band RF Group 
Orbital Replacement Unit (ORU) vendor, MDA, on the probability of corona occurring in the 
ACRFG, and review a test plan and results of an engineering corona test on a bandpass filter 
assembly believed to be susceptible to corona at the reduced pressures.
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6.0 Description of the Problem and Proposed Solutions 
6.1 Description of the Problem 
On April 13, 2006, there was a reflected RF power anomaly observed after four minutes nominal 
operation within the ACRFG (refer to Figure 6.1-1).  This was in the “String 1 RFG” unit on S1 
(S/N 002) as shown on the ISS in Figure 6.1-2.  The “String 2 RFG” unit (S/N 003) on P6 is the 
primary unit.  The spare unit (S/N 001) is stowed on Z1.  Corona was examined as a possible 
root cause of the anomaly.  Section 3.5 of the MDA ACRFG Reflected RF Power Anomaly 
Report (ref. 1) determined the necessary voltages to produce corona, at various pressures, in the 
narrowest electrode gaps in the coaxial cavity 5-pole diplexer and 3-pole bandpass filter (see 
Figure 6.1-3) assemblies.  The results of the MDA analysis suggest the conditions present in the 
Bandpass Filter and Diplexer at 1 psia may have been favorable for the corona. 
Figure 6.1-1. S-Band Assembly Contingency RF Group (ref. 5) 
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Figure 6.1-2. ISS S-Band Installation Sites 
Figure 6.1-3. Bandpass Filter Assembly (ref. 5) 
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Figure 6.1-4. Bandpass Filter Tuning Screw and Gap (ref. 5) 
However, corona was judged unlikely in the initial MDA report because of the observed on-orbit 
condition of four minutes of normal operation followed by degraded service.  The end of Section 
3.5 (ref. 1) states: "Corona events tend to be a violent occurrence and with permanent damage.  
Continued operation would not be sustained."  For these reasons, a solder joint at the input to the 
bandpass filter was initially identified by MDA as the most likely proximate cause of the on-
orbit ACRFG anomaly. 
6.2 Proposed Solution  
The NESC team concurred with the ISS Program’s proposed use of the ACRFG for the June 6, 
2006 EVA followed by storage and replacement if it can be accepted that loss of the unit could 
occur and it can be confirmed that failure would not propagate to adjacent components.  The 
NESC team recommended conducting a 1-psia corona test on the non-flight unit, and doing so if 
possible before the on-board unit is turned on.  The test may prove that the unit would run better 
than the analysis indicated and also determine how the unit will perform with reduced pressure.   
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7.0 Data Analysis 
The major tasks completed during the consultation included the following: 
x Reviewed and participated in discussion on MDA RF corona analysis.
x Reviewed on-orbit pressure decay data.  
x Reviewed test plan for corona test of engineering unit.
x Performed analysis of probability of corona at low pressures. 
x Reviewed results of the engineering tests of a Bandpass Filter assembly. 
The results of each of these tasks will be discussed in the following sections. 
7.1 Review of MDA Corona Analysis and Pressure Decay Data 
A teleconference was conducted with the NESC team members, ISS personnel, and contractor, 
MDA, on May 9, 2006, to discuss the MDA’s draft ACRFG Reflected RF Power Anomaly 
report dated May 5, 2006 (ref. 1).  The preliminary comments summarized below were 
forwarded to the ISS Program on May 10, 11, and 17, 2006.   
The MDA’s analysis showed probable formation of a coronal discharge within the transmitter 
filter, and possible formation at other locations within the unit, at a pressure of 1 psia.  MDA’s 
computations are intrinsically uncertain as the actual coronal discharge is sensitive to cavity 
features that were ignored (or not well known) in the utilized model.  Therefore, it is not 
appropriate to use the predicted negative margin as conclusive proof that there was corona 
present.  However, a review of the analysis, other assumptions, and boundary conditions suggest 
it is reasonable to suppose that there was a corona event.
Regarding the MDA analysis, the 1970 Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) document, Technical 
Report 32-1500 “Final Report on RF Voltage Breakdown in Coaxial Transmission Lines” (ref. 6) 
used to determine the corona calculations also explains the complexity of the variables (pressure, 
distance, and frequency) that are used.  This computation is far more involved than a direct 
current (DC) or low frequency application of the Paschen curve.  The accuracy of translating the 
JPL report's coaxial configuration test data to a different geometry is not known.  The report also 
states a more pronounced effect on breakdown at high frequencies due to conductor shape 
variations.
Section 3.5 of the MDA report determined the necessary voltages to produce corona, at various 
pressures, in the narrowest electrode gaps present in the subassemblies.  As shown, the 
conditions present in the three pole Band Pass Filter and Diplexer at 1 psia may have been 
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favorable for corona.  However, corona as a cause was judged unlikely because of the observed 
on-orbit conditions of four minutes normal operation and then degraded operation.  The end of 
Section 3.5 states “Corona tends to be a violent occurrence and with permanent damage.  
Continued operation would not be sustained.” 
The NESC team supported the engineering corona test that was proposed during the 
teleconference.  However, there were some concerns expressed on configurational differences 
between the ACRFGs in ground testing and the flight units that could affect the test results. 
A low pressure 1 psia test is needed to establish two critical points: 
a. Verify the expected destructive characteristic of a corona suggested in Section 3.5 of the MDA 
report.
It has been the experience of the NESC team high voltage expert that in some cases corona is not 
necessarily violent, and a prediction of permanent damage is difficult to substantiate.  While the 
breakdown voltage has been estimated, breakdown energy had not been determined especially in 
reference to the power that can be delivered.  While it is doubtful that the corona energy could be 
supported with continued operation, perhaps a sustained low power level corona may have 
existed.
b. Verify derived voltage breakdown estimates. 
Section 3.5 states the use of R.Woo’s Technical Report (ref. 6) in determining the breakdown 
voltages at various pressures for the 2.25 giga hertz (GHz) operation and mentions the 
uncertainty introduced by sharp edges producing field enhancements.  Even though the derived 
corona inception voltages are viewed as “best case,” perhaps the actual breakdown voltages are 
higher.  Although not likely, this test could give stronger evidence that corona did not occur. 
The 1970 Woo report (ref. 6) uses some measured data and some derived data in its Figure 21, 
RF Voltage Breakdown in Uniform Fields in Air, and with the difficulty of extrapolating from 
the plot, the accuracy may not be adequate.  Perhaps more recent reports may provide supporting 
data.  As stated, the introduction of non-uniform fields in the actual hardware will alter the 
breakdown voltage, probably downward.  However, the affect on non-uniform fields in RF 
voltage breakdown are not always predicable. 
The NESC team suggested that the 1 psia corona test should be performed on the non-flight unit 
before the on-board unit is turned on.  This was not intended to imply a mission constraint, since 
it may be argued that box failure of the ACRFT (S/N 002) would not be adverse to safety.  This 
opinion was that a test would provide more objective evidence than an analysis in determining 
how the unit will perform with reduced pressure. 
The MDA report had concluded that a solder joint failure at the input of the bandpass filter was 
the most likely proximate cause of the on-orbit anomaly.  The NESC Team noted that it is 
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possible that corona inside the filter cavity could erode (or more likely melt open) the solder 
connection attaching the injection loop's end to the case-wall, leading to a separation and result 
in observed signal loss.  If the solder melted, or even reached the softening temperature, then the 
residual stresses in the loop (shown in Figure 3.2-2, page 16 of the MDA report) could allow 
separation.   This hypothetical detachment would also drop the voltage level in the cavity below 
the value needed to sustain the corona, at least for the present pressure.  If this solder connection 
separation has happened, then there can be no further corona until the pressure decreases enough 
to move the system far enough along the Paschen curve so that the plasma threshold drops to the 
now-available voltage level.  The predicted time for this change in plasma threshold could be 
approximated from the measured leak rate and the Paschen curve for N2.
The details of the separation between the loop's end and the case could be temperature-
dependent, and this could perhaps cause the now-observed temperature dependence of the signal 
loss.  This seems possible, but is certainly not established with any certainty.  Testing with a 
ground unit may be useful in probing this candidate explanation. 
The ACRFG S/N 002 has been recently operated for durations extending to 24 hours and shown 
essentially stable operation, aside from initial "warm up" transients lasting for times on the order 
of seconds to tens of minutes.  These characteristics are consistent with "no corona" 
performance.  However, it is expected the potential for corona will increase when the internal 
pressure degrades further.
Hence, operation of ACRFG S/N 002 was a reasonable use of assets for the EVA planned for 
June 6, 2006.  It was prudent to document that no coronal-induced damage can "escape" the 
transmitter to cause harm or mis-function of adjacent equipment.  It is likely that the diplexer 
will protect the receiver so even if the transmitter fails, the receiver may remain viable.  This 
may not matter since if the transmitter fails completely, the redundant unit (S/N 001) will most 
likely be used.
There is a possible concern related to the isolator/dummy load in the transmitter solid state 
power amplifier.  Can heat or some other failure in the dummy load cause a failure beyond this 
subsystem?  If a fuse blows, will only this subsystem be affected?  It also must be recognized 
that as the ACRFG S/N 002 this transmitter is now operating" off design," it may degrade further 
at any time.  
The NESC team also suggested evaluating the on-orbit performance data more thoroughly with 
additional trend information (temperature, pressure, etc.).  The NESC team observed that the 
choice of N2 plus He may not be optimal for RF applications.  It was suggested that a superior 
dielectric gas such as N2 plus sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) should be considered.  SF6 is a very 
electro-negative molecule that does not give up electrons readily which suppresses corona. 
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Further, the use of 8 psia as the base internal pressure level adds risk for two reasons.  First, a 
leak on the ground is difficult to assess since the pressure differential is somewhat less than in a 
vacuum (6.7 psia versus 8.0 psia), and the gas that would leak in on the ground (air) is different 
than the gas that would leak out (N2 plus He) in space.  Second, the pressure vessel goes from 
being compressed on the ground to being expanded in space.  Therefore, a leak may not show up 
on the ground that may occur in space. 
One other item of interest to the NESC team was the leak performance on the other RF systems 
(and the spare if it has been stored in vacuum).  Has it also leaked down or is it holding pressure 
correctly?  This has implications for both better understanding the problem as well as developing 
an optimal replacement strategy. 
The on-orbit symptoms do not indicate corona had occurred to produce the observed anomalous 
performance.  Although the development of corona at some point cannot be precluded due to 
continued internal pressure decay.
It would be beneficial to evaluate an actual solder joint.  It may be possible that thermal changes 
affecting a solder joint could produce the anomaly alone.  However, there is no present analysis 
to show what the thermal range is. 
The NESC team reviewed pressure decay data provided by the ISS Program (ref. 3).  Concern 
was expressed that the real Paschen domain will be entered in the next year or so.  Therefore, 
even if acceptable operation was achieved for the planned June 6 EVA, it will be important to 
replace this unit with an acceptable ACRFG as soon as practical. 
The NESC team was asked to review an additional report “ACRFG EPC Worst Case Voltage 
Summary Rev E.”  On page 21, the report states:  “It was determined that all printed circuit 
boards (PCBs) and terminals are adequately conformally coated, including all transformers.” The 
NESC team noted that conformal coating can block a current flow (by introducing a high 
resistance), but it will not block an electric field.  It can affect an electric field through its 
dielectric constant, but most conformal coatings are thin and so this effect is often ignorable.  An 
electric field within a cavity induces the ionization of gas, and thereby creates corona, regardless 
of the presence of any conformal coating.  
7.2 Analysis of the Probability of Corona Occurrence at Reduced Pressures 
On May 17, 2006, the NESC team was requested to assist with calculations of probability of 
corona events as pressure decreases below the current level of 1 psia.  The results of these 
analyses were provided to the ISS Program on May 23, 2006 and are summarized below. 
The charts in Figure 7.2-1 show the RF breakdown voltages for a range of pressures in an air 
environment (refs. 5 and 6).  For the purposes of this analysis, N2 and air are considered 
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equivalent.  As discussed, the actual levels need to be determined by test, as the data is retrieved 
from the ideal case of uniform fields. 
However, it can be seen that the worst case range is between 0.01 and 1 psia and the inception 
level is so low that corona is likely. 
As an engineering judgment, it would be reasonable to assign the following probabilities: 
1. At pressures between 0.001 psia and 1 psia, corona is almost certain (>90 percent) for the 
gap sizes within these assemblies (>90 percent). 
2. At pressures of greater than 2 psia, corona at any gap size is unlikely (<10 percent). 
3. Between 0.1 and 1 psia, the margin between the operating voltage and corona inception 
level is essentially non-existent, and the likelihood of corona should be moderate (~70 
percent).
4. Below approximately 0.001 psia, multipactor breakdown dominates over ionization 
breakdown.  Corona does not occur in hard vacuum (e.g. <0.00001 psia).  However, 
multipactor breakdown is still possible for small gaps (0.1 inch) in this pressure region, 
so a breakdown probability of 50 percent would be appropriate. 
In the 1 to 2 psia region, the probability of corona is undefined.  This is the “knee” of the 
Paschen curve where the breakdown voltage characteristic changes greatly with small changes in 
pressure.
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Figure 7.2-1. Breakdown Voltage versus Pressure for Various Gaps (in air) from Woo 
Curves (ref. 6) 
7.3 Engineering Bandpass Filter Corona Test Results Review 
The ISS Program requested that MDA perform an engineering corona test of a bandpass filter 
assembly, per the May 9, 2006, teleconference discussions.  The ISS Program requested that the 
NESC team review and comment on the corona test plan (ref. 2) and report.  The test report was 
provided to the NESC team, and written comments were solicited (ref. 4).  A teleconference to 
discuss these was held with NESC ISS Program and Boeing personnel on November 28, 2006.  
Written inputs were provided on November 12 and 14, 2006, to the ISS Program.  These inputs 
are summarized as follows. 
The NESC team concluded that in the test bandpass filter a corona event was observed 
repeatedly at 0.3 psia which could explain the on-orbit observations.  The NESC team observed 
that the report is well written and shows clear distinction between corona and multipactoring 
with excellent use of pictures and graphs.  An interesting result of the test was that the filter 
properties were essentially unchanged after the testing, even though there was visible evidence of 
the corona.  Permanent damage did not occur as a result of approximately 12 minutes of corona 
conditions during the testing.  This may possible be due to the limited duration allowed for the 
corona.  Although not tested, multipactoring may also be a threat at very low pressures (less than 
2 x 10-5 psia. 
However, the NESC team noted that a key missing item was a test to failure in order to 
understand how many hours of operation (as the system is operated) can be realistically expected 
prior to complete failure. 
As a note on N2 plus He, the addition of He dramatically reduces the breakdown voltage at low 
pressures.  However, the He will have leaked out so the N2 operation is probably realistic. 
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The test results were quite good, especially to show good correlation between predicted and 
measured conditions of frequency, pressure, and power levels.   It was not clear to the NESC 
team whether the report's conclusion claims corona the likely cause or still just a possible cause 
of the observed performance anomaly. 
During the November 28, 2006, teleconference, the NESC team concluded that the results of 
testing substantially increased the relative likelihood of corona as being the cause of the on-orbit 
anomaly (estimated as from a level of 1 or 2 to 5 on a scale of 10).   
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8.0 Findings, Recommendations, and Observations
8.1 Findings 
F-1. Corona inception is a real threat at reduced pressure of approximately 1 psia.   
F-2. An engineering unit test to assess corona effects provided valuable technical insight.
Permanent damage did not occur as a result of approximately 12 minutes of corona 
conditions during the testing. 
F-3. The team concurred with use of the ACRFG (S/N 002) for the June 6, 2006, EVA as long 
as it can be accepted that loss of the unit could occur, and it can be confirmed that failure 
would not propagate outside the unit. 
F-4. The team concurred with the engineering bandpass filter test report conclusion that the 
results show corona may be one of the possible causes for the ACRFG (S/N 002) on-orbit 
behavior.
8.2 Observations 
O-1. Although not tested, multipactoring may also be a threat at very lower pressures (less 
than 2 x 10-5 psia). 
O-2. It was noted that although this RF system is dependent on maintaining pressurization for 
proper operation and pressure, leakage is a credible failure mode.  Instrumentation used 
to measure internal pressure did not have sufficient resolution and accuracy to make 
accurate measurements in the low pressure regime where multipactoring or corona can 
occur.
8.3 Recommendations 
R-1. Perform a failure analysis on the returned anomalous ACRFG (S/N 002) to determine the 
proximate and root cause(s) of the on-orbit malfunction. (F-4, O-1) 
R-2. With the continued loss of pressure, avoid further operation of the anomalous ACRFG 
(S/N 002) unit.  (F-4, O-1) 
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9.0 Alternate Viewpoints 
There were no alternate viewpoints expressed during this consultation. 
10.0 Other Deliverables 
There were no other deliverables for this consultation. 
11.0 Lessons Learned 
LL-1. RF systems that are dependent on maintaining pressurization for proper operation should 
consider the addition of instrumentation to measure internal pressure with sufficient 
resolution and accuracy to make trustworthy measurements in the low pressure regime 
where multipactoring or corona can occur. 
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12.0 Definition of Terms 
Corona Corona is caused by electrons torn out of atoms of a gas by a strong 
electric field causing a current to flow in the gas.
Corrective Actions Changes to design processes, work instructions, workmanship practices, 
training, inspections, tests, procedures, specifications, drawings, tools, 
equipment, facilities, resources, or material that result in preventing, 
minimizing, or limiting the potential for recurrence of a problem.  
Finding A conclusion based on facts established during the assessment/inspection 
by the investigating authority.
Lessons Learned Knowledge or understanding gained by experience. The experience may 
be positive, as in a successful test or mission, or negative, as in a mishap 
or failure. A lesson must be significant in that it has real or assumed 
impact on operations; valid in that it is factually and technically correct; 
and applicable in that it identifies a specific design, process, or decision 
that reduces or limits the potential for failures and mishaps, or reinforces a 
positive result.  
Multipactoring Resonant effect caused by electrons accelerating due to an electric field in 
a vacuum and colliding with a metal surface with enough energy to cause 
the emission of secondary electrons.   
Observation A factor, event, or circumstance identified during the 
assessment/inspection that did not contribute to the problem, but if left 
uncorrected has the potential to cause a mishap, injury, or increase the 
severity should a mishap occur.  
Problem The subject of the technical assessment/inspection. 
Requirement An action developed by the assessment/inspection team to correct the 
cause or a deficiency identified during the investigation. The requirements 
will be used in the preparation of the corrective action plan.  
Root Cause Along a chain of events leading to a mishap or close call, the first causal 
action or failure to act that could have been controlled systemically either 
by policy/practice/procedure or individual adherence to 
policy/practice/procedure.
S-Band RF frequency of approximately 2 GHz commonly used in manned space 
communications.
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13.0 Acronyms 
ACRFG Assembly and Contingency Radio Frequency Group 
DC  direct current 
EVA  Extravehicular Activity 
GHz  Giga Hertz 
GSFC  Goddard Space Flight Center 
He  helium 
ISS  International Space Station 
JPL  Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
MDA  MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates Ltd. 
N2  nitrogen 
NASA  National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NESC   NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
NRB  NESC Review Board 
ORU  Orbital Replacement Unit 
psia  pounds per square inch absolute 
RF  radio frequency 
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